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Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent
Small Claims Court?
Robert P. Greenspoon*
In the past few years, legislative proposals for United States
patent reform have centered on changing the Patent Act.1 Some
commentators have questioned patent reform, asking whether such
proposals favor large interests at the expense of individuals and small
businesses.2 Overlooked since 1992 in discussions about patent
reform is an obscure proposal that ought to help individuals, small
businesses, large businesses, consumers, and the court system
itself—a Patent Small Claims Court.
In the early 1990s, several important policy groups, including the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), voiced support for such a court,
but, ultimately, no one took up the cause.3 At the time, these policy
groups expressed concerns that transaction costs for patent
enforcement under the current U.S. system are prohibitively high for
a significant subset of inventors—namely, those who stand to recover
only small sums from any given infringer.4
In this article, I re-propose (with improvements) a Patent Small
Claims Court for the United States. Time has shown that such a court
will credibly address a major failure in the current patent system—its
© 2009 Robert P. Greenspoon.
* Member, Flachsbart & Greenspoon, LLC. I thank William W. Flachsbart,
Michael R. La Porte, and Jennifer F. Yorke for their ideas and assistance. I
especially thank the Honorable Brian Barnett Duff (U.S. Senior District
Judge, retired) for his thoughtful input. Unless otherwise indicated, the
views and opinions in this article are my own, and should not be
attributed to any of the people I named above, or to any of my clients.
1 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007);
Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent Reform
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
2 See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Another Horse in the Race, 15 INTELL.
PROP. TODAY 22, 22 (2008) (sarcastically renaming the lobbying group
“Coalition for Patent Fairness” as the “Coalition for Fairness to Foxes in
the Henhouse”).
3 See discussion infra Part II.
4 Id.
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inability to guarantee economical patent enforcement to all deserving
patentees. Statistics from AIPLA confirm that transaction costs in the
current system can be prohibitive.5 Meanwhile, other countries have
shown that such a court can work. For example, England and Wales
established a successful patent small claims court in 1990.6 In the
United States, a Patent Small Claims Court would be advantageous to
individuals and small businesses, to large interests with small
disputes, and to large interests seeking systemic change to ensure the
current court system is used only for cases that ought to be there.
After introducing the general concept and rationale for a Patent
Small Claims Court in the next section, I then discuss notable
interest shown by the ABA and other bodies to similar proposals in
the early 1990s. Next, I discuss the success of the Patents County
Court in England and Wales. Finally, I propose a workable
mechanism for implementing a Patent Small Claims Court system in
the United States. I suggest local rules to add a patent small claims
division in one or more district courts on an experimental basis. If
that experiment succeeds, congressional action might implement it
nationwide.

I.

A SMALL CLAIMS COURT TO BRING EFFECTIVE
PATENT REFORM

For a significant subset of aggrieved innovators, the patent
system has failed. While our federal court system has exclusive
jurisdiction over matters relating to patent enforcement, it lacks
particular rules or practices to make small-scale patent enforcement
rational and effective. According to statistics reported in AIPLA’s 2007
Report of the Economic Survey, patent cases in the least-expensive
quartile nevertheless cost an average of $380,000 in fees and
expenses to get through trial and appeal, where less than one million
dollars in damages is at issue.7 Those same statistics show, mindbogglingly, that patent cases at the most expensive quartile cost an
average of one million dollars in fees and expenses, even where the
potential recovery is less than one million dollars.8
The deterrent effect of these high costs to enforcing small-scale
patent rights is self-evident. To seek a litigated resolution in the
5

See infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.
7 LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N,
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-90 (2007) [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY].
8 Id.
6
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current environment of fees and expenses, where less than one
million dollars is at stake, a rights holder must risk taking an action
that might very well cost more than the potential recovery. The
situation seems even bleaker when realizing that these expenses only
buy access to the courts. Once there, even the best case has (as the
saying goes) an eighty percent chance of success.9 While there are
potential findings of willfulness, which might enhance damages by
three times under section 284 of the Patent Act,10 or of an exceptional
case, where the court may refund attorney fees under section 285 of
the Patent Act,11 such outlier scenarios do not usually factor into
initial decisions over whether to begin an enforcement action.12
A Patent Small Claims Court would fill this gap in our system.
The small claims court should, first, be skilled enough to resolve
cases correctly, and, second, be cost-effective. By implication, it
should be fast and efficient. If there were a good, cheap, and fast way
to bring a small claim to resolution, the patentee’s dilemma would be
vastly reduced.
A small claims court for patent disputes would help individuals,
small businesses, large businesses, and the court system itself. In
contrast to the present patent litigation environment, where
individuals or small businesses often cannot economically enforce
their intellectual property rights even when they are willfully infringed
upon, such a court system would provide a new opportunity.
Unblocking access to the courts for a deserving subset of patentees
will have the salutary effect of encouraging innovation. Helping
innovation, in turn, helps consumers.13
The very option for a patentee to file in small claims court would
motivate good faith pre-suit negotiations. That is, if it were no longer
effective for an accused infringer to ignore, or delay resolution of, a
9 Cf. GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 587
(7th ed. 2004) (describing how, in one context, the English legal system
designates cases that have a very good chance of success as those that
have an 80 percent or better chance of success).
10 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
11 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
12 The possibility of contingency fee representation would not change
the analysis: few contingency fee lawyers would sign onto a case knowing
their best sweep-the-boards outcome will yield them something less than
their hourly rate—even substantially less.
13 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995) (“In the
absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly
exploit the efforts of innovators and investors without compensation.
Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and
erode incentives to invest, ultimately to the detriment of consumers.”).
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small-scale notice of infringement, the accused infringer would be
required to credit the merits of such a claim. That is not to say any
weaknesses of a claim would or should go unheeded. Instead, as often
practiced during negotiations of large-scale patent infringement
settlements, those weaknesses would be factored into a rational
analysis leading to a discounted royalty amount.14 If, however, the
weaknesses in a patentee’s claim were indeed fatal, or if business
exigencies require a vigorous defense, an accused infringer would
retain the option to decline to change a design or decline to pay a
royalty. The creation of an inexpensive small claims court system
would thus be a positive development for every category of accused
infringers of any size. It either motivates ex ante behavior that leads
more predictably to lawsuit avoidance, or it diminishes the
transaction costs of whatever lawsuits cannot be avoided.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the existence of such an enforcement
forum would also reduce overall federal court burdens. First, the
presence of a small claims court would encourage negotiated
resolutions for good faith small-scale disputes. Reduction in
enforcement transaction costs would make it more likely that parties
to a small-scale patent dispute will try to resolve the dispute.
According to some, lowering transaction costs spawns more
litigation.15 But, “[p]rocedures that affect the risks of trial may also
have the opposite effect” compared to what was intended.16 In
particular, increasing the amount of unbiased predictive information
available to the parties will tend to reduce the number of suits.17 A
small claims court would do just that—provide a wealth of data on
how similarly situated cases resolve—although one might expect a
transitional period of increased litigation while parties test the new
forum.18 Second, having a small claims court for patent disputes
14 John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What to do After MedImmune
v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 364, 369 (2007).
15 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 62 (1996)
(“[A] procedure that lowers the cost of litigation—for example, a smallclaims court—will increase the volume of litigation and the number of
trials (albeit cheaper, quicker trials).”).
16 Id. at 61.
17 Id. at 60–61.
18 See id. at 51 (“If trials became vanishingly rare, lawyers and
litigants would make increasingly crude predictions of trial verdicts. As a
result, there would be more cases in which their ill-informed guesses
would be too far apart to compromise; which would lead to more trials,
more verdicts, and better information on trial outcomes; which, in turn,
would produce more settlements, and reduce or stabilize the trial rate.”).
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would operate as a release valve, removing significant burdens from
the current court system. According to statistics in the 2007 AIPLA
survey, twenty-eight percent of reported patent cases (341 out of
1206) involved less than one million dollars at issue.19 Setting the
“small” threshold at this level has the potential to eliminate about
one-third of all patent cases from the regular federal court docket.
Large entities would also benefit. Even large entities experience
small-scale infringement problems, and these, too, could be resolved
in a small claims forum. In addition, large entities are most affected
by a certain type of plaintiff who uses the costs of litigation (rather
than the merits of the claim) as a false proxy of settlement value.20
For instance, in the current system, a legitimate claim for $100,000
might involve a conservative defense budget of $300,000, distorting
the rational settlement value well above the value of the claimed
damages. Such cases, though largely irrational for a plaintiff to file
strictly on the merits, do exist; as noted, 341 out of 1206 patent cases
in the latest survey period involve less than one million dollars at
issue.21 If, on the other hand, the same defendant could defend that
claim in a small claims setting, the rational settlement value would
fall much closer to (and indeed below) the claimed damages. Thus,
large entities would also benefit from a reduction in transaction cost
distortions caused by the current system of expensive patent
litigation.

II. PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF PATENT SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several well-respected policy
groups, including the ABA, voiced favor for a patent small claims
procedure. Despite this, such proposals stalled.

19

AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 7, at I-90–91.
See Bruce Hay & Kathryn Spier, Litigation and Settlement 23
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion
Paper
No.
218,
1997),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/218.pdf
(“Another common motivation [of policymakers] is to prevent litigants from
compelling their adversaries to accept settlements that do not reflect the
underlying merit of the claim—as when, for example, a plaintiff with a
frivolous claim extracts a substantial sum from the defendant by
threatening the defendant with costly litigation.”).
21 AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 7, at I-90 to 91. Of
course, such cases are not necessarily irrational as long as the plaintiff
factors in an opponent’s propensity for early settlement.
20
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A. 1990 ABA RESOLUTION 401.4
The ABA sponsored the most important prior work on patent
small claims. In 1990 the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Law (“ABA Section”) adopted Resolution 401.4 in support of
a small claims patent procedure. The text of the Resolution stated:
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law favors, in principal, legislation for the establishment of an
expedited, low-cost small claims procedure within the federal
judiciary for the resolution of civil patent and copyright disputes
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, having an amount in
controversy less than an appropriate stated sum.22

The ABA Section envisioned some of the details of its small
claims procedure. The full text of those details follows here. It is
notable that the ABA Section acknowledged prior statements in
support of a small claims procedure, including that of AIPLA, which
suggested an even greater threshold of “small” than the ABA (one
million dollars instead of $100,000, in 1990 dollars):
The proposed procedure would mandate that all disputes,
involving exclusive federal jurisdiction subject matter having an
amount in controversy less than $100,000 be resolved through
this procedure. The procedure would be limited to disputes based
upon exclusive federal jurisdiction. No pendant jurisdiction claim
may be maintained. No counterclaim other than those which
could have separately been brought using the federal small claims
procedure may be maintained.
All other compulsory
counterclaims are separate causes of action and must be brought
in the normal course in the district court where it would have
been brought. The federal small claims procedure would be
initiated by either the plaintiff or the counterclaim defendant and
would be removable to the federal district court by the defendant
or the counterclaim defendant.
A magistrate would preside and rule in all federal small claims
procedure disputes. The plaintiff would not have a right to “trial
by jury.” This could pose a constitutional problem in that, at first
blush, it appears to violate the 6th [sic: presumably 7th]
Amendment. However, the federal small claims procedure
contemplates that a losing litigant may appeal the decision to the
district court where the case would be tried “de novo.” This would
overcome the constitutional objections. However, to thwart
continuous appeals to the district court, thereby frustrating the
purpose of the federal small claims procedure if the appellant
loses on “appeal,” then the appellant would pay all costs,
including attorneys’ fees to the appellee. This would be a
22 Federal Small Claims Procedure, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. COMM. REP. 194 (report of Ronald L. Yin, Chairman,
Subcomm. B).
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deterrent to all appellants in that only “meritorious appeals” will
be maintained.
Similarly, because this would be an expedited procedure,
provisions should not be made for willful damages or for
attorneys’ fees. Further, the plaintiff could not seek equitable
remedies; the federal small claims procedure is only for damages.
However, a prevailing litigant could use the judgment obtained in
the federal small claims procedure as the basis for a motion to the
district court judge for an entry of equitable remedies. The
fairness or the thoroughness of the small claims proceedings
could be examined by the district court judge in determining
whether or not to issue equitable remedies. Since equitable relief
considers all the circumstances, the fact that the judgment was
obtained through the federal small claims procedure would be a
factor to be considered by the federal district court.
In addition, there should be some limitations on discovery and/or
trial. Because the purpose of the federal small claims procedure is
to resolve disputes in an expedited and inexpensive manner,
discovery limitations and trial date limitations should be
specifically set forth in the procedure.
Finally and most importantly, although the resolution proposes a
limitation of $100,000, the committee is not in unanimous
agreement as to this amount. There is a lot of sentiment for
increasing the amount. Clearly, with the passage of 28 U.S.C.
1332 increasing the limit for diversity purposes from $10,000 to
$50,000 indicating Congressional sentiment that the federal
judiciary should not be the forum for diversity actions less than
$50,000, $50,000 seems to be the smallest amount which should
be considered as the ceiling for the small claims procedure. There
are many members of the committee who have expressed the view
that the amount should be between $100,000 and $500,000. In
fact, the AIPLA has a proposal similar to the current proposal,
suggesting a One Million Dollar ($1,000,000.00) limit for
resolution of disputes of small claims.23

The ABA Section knew it was not working in a vacuum. The
detailed discussion of Resolution 401.4 states, “the AIPLA has a
proposal similar to the current proposal . . . .”24 Indeed, in
subcommittee
discussions
leading
to
the
resolution, the
subcommittee members noted other groups were very much in favor
of a patent small claims procedure.25
During subcommittee discussion of the resolution, minutes show
one member moved to amend the text to make explicit that the
resolution suggested a “mandatory” procedure. In the process, he
noted the enthusiastic support that already existed for such a
23

Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 196.
25 See Division IV—Related Legal Issues, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 82.
24
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proposal:
Mr. Dunner then moved to amend: “The amendment would be in
line 2, to delete the word ‘an’ before ‘expedited’ and to insert in its
place ‘a mandatory.’” The motion was duly seconded, and Mr.
Dunner spoke on the motion: “I make this motion because I am
convinced that that was the intent of the proposal, and, in fact,
that is the intent of related proposals that have been floating
around in the AIPLA and other groups, which have received a lot
of support from a lot of leaders of the profession.
There was a conference at the Franklin Pierce Law School in New
Hampshire within the last year, and there were at least 20 or 30
opinion leaders in the profession who are almost unanimous in
their excitement about this kind of procedure. But their
excitement was keyed to it being mandatory; but if it is voluntary,
you have nothing more or less than you have today.”26

Resolution 401.4 did not catch on, nor did the other work by
“AIPLA and other groups”27 and the 20 or 30 “leaders of the
profession.”28 That is understandable, in light of (a) the fairly complex
Seventh Amendment accommodations; (b) the use of magistrate
judges nationwide; (c) removability to an ordinary court by a
defendant.
First, under the procedure envisioned by the ABA Section, a
plaintiff is restricted to a nonjury trial for the first adjudication of its
claim. Since patent cases must be tried to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment,29 the ABA Section proposes a constitutional cure for this
facially defective approach: a de novo jury trial “appeal” for the loser.
Plaintiffs would find this cure both unappealing and radical—
unappealing because the first non-jury adjudication would doubtless
get some sort of deference and radical because no such “jury appeal”
has existed before in the federal judiciary. Nor is it clear that such a
cure would pass the necessary test of constitutionality.
Second, proposing a single nationwide change to the court
system, without proper testing, was likely too ambitious. Without a
record of success in a limited environment, advocates of patent small
claims courts would find it difficult to interest members of Congress
in a major structural change benefiting a single species of federal
litigant. In addition, the resolution presupposes that magistrate
26

Id.
Id.
28 Id.
29 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that patent infringement actions descended from
actions at law and, consequently, must be tried to a jury as required by
the Seventh Amendment).
27
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judges would support such an increase in their workload. Any
concerted opposition by the nation’s magistrate judges might doom
such an ambitious legislative proposal.
Third, removability would defeat the purpose of a “mandatory”
small claims procedure. If a defendant removed a case, its
commencement in small claims court would end up having been a
wasted expense with nothing gained. Even a defendant who removed
under pretext would gain a tactical advantage, for the threat and
actuality of removal would incrementally increase the plaintiff’s costs.
The perceived risk of magnified expense, whether it is the prospect of
ending up in an ordinary court or the prospect of spending money to
stay out, would deter the use of the small claims procedure. This
would dilute any positive ex ante behavioral changes among patentees
and accused infringers pre-suit that would otherwise increase the
frequency of negotiated settlements.
The final section of this article contains a proposal that avoids all
of these pitfalls of Resolution 401.4.

B. 1992 PATENT REFORM COMMISSION APPROVAL
During the wave of patent reform proposals in the early 1990s,
the U.S. Department of Commerce itself took action. In 1990
Commerce formed the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform.30
Among the many issues on which the Commission sought public
comment was the possibility of a small claims court for patents. In a
Federal Register notice, the Commission included the following topic
in its request for comment: “Is there a need for a ‘small claims’ type of
patent proceeding in the Federal courts . . . .”31
At least one of the Commission’s numerous members, Donald
Dunner, was also a subcommittee member involved in drafting
Resolution 401.4.32 In the Commission’s final report to the Secretary
of Commerce, the Commission indicated, albeit in a faintly positive
way, that the matter needed to be studied further:
The Commission also recommends consideration and use of other
30

ADVISORY COMM’N ON PAT. LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
COMMERCE, at ii (1992) (letter from Commission chairman to
Commerce Secretary).
31 Request for Comments for the Advisory Commission on Patent Law
Reform, 56 Fed. Reg. 22, 702, 22, 703 (May 16, 1991).
32 See Division IV—Related Legal Issues, supra note 25; see also
Biography
of
Donald
R.
Dunner
(2005),
http://taiwanip.org/bios/DunnerDonaldBio.pdf (listing Mr. Dunner’s accomplishments,
including terms of service as a member of the Secretary of Commerce’s
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform and as an AIPLA President
and member).
OF
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means of resolving patent disputes. For example, the Commission
urges greater awareness and use of alternate dispute resolution to
resolve patent disputes, as well as consideration of special
procedures to conduct patent litigation. The Commission urges
that three proposals be studied further, specifically,
- designating specialized patent courts,
- intra-circuit sharing of judges with experience in patent
litigation, and
- adoption of a “small claims” procedure for patent cases in
Federal courts.33

This is where the trail goes cold.34 There do not appear to be any
actions in support of a small claims procedure for United States
patent cases since 1992. Thus, despite support from the AIPLA, the
ABA, numerous “opinion leaders,” plus “a lot of leaders of the
profession,” and Commerce’s own Advisory Commission on Patent
Law Reform, no parties thereafter have taken any serious steps to
augment the U.S. court system with a small claims court for patent
disputes. Additionally, apart from the shortcomings of some details
within such proposals, which are eliminated by the new proposal set
forth here, no one seems to have suggested any reason to abandon
the general idea of a Patent Small Claims Court.

III. THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT AS A POTENTIAL
MODEL
While practitioners in the United States were merely talking
about a small claims court, England and Wales were actually forming
one. This established court supplies a comparative law example that
can teach much about how to craft a successful small claims court for
the United States.
By way of background, ordinary patent cases in England are
tried to a specialized court—the Patents Court. Presently, seven
judges sit on the Patents Court, which is part of the High Court.35
There are no jury trials.36
33

(1992).

ADVISORY COMM’N ON PAT. LAW REFORM, supra note 30, at 13–14

34 In an email to the author, Mr. Dunner reflected, “I don’t recall
anybody picking up on it and doubt if anyone is considering it today.” Email from Donald Dunner to author (Dec. 30, 2008) (on file with author).
35 See THE PATENTS COURT GUIDE § 3 (2008), http://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/cms/files/Patents_Court_Guide_as_revised_on_18_Novemb
er_2008.pdf (authorized by the Chancellor of the High Court, United
Kingdom).
36 John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a
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In the late 1980s a group of English practitioners suggested
the creation of a Patents County Court (“PCC”) as an alternative to the
High Court for patent litigation.37 Enabling legislation passed in
1988, and the first (and only) PCC formed in London in 1990.38 One
judge, Judge Michael Fysh, QC, sits on the PCC.39
As Judge Fysh has written, the purpose of the PCC is “to cater
for the needs principally of medium and small size firms in litigating
patents, registered designs and certain other cases involving similar
rights.”40 Others have remarked that “[t]he intention was to provide a
court which had procedures which were designed to reduce costs and
increase the speed of patent litigation,”41 primarily for “private
inventors or smaller companies.”42
As the PCC has evolved, it has kept its focus on small companies
and fast cases more through court practice and custom than through
rules or thresholds. The PCC and the Patents Court of the High Court
do not have any formal jurisdictional division in relation to patent
disputes.43 There is, rather, “an understanding that the ‘simpler’
cases will find their way to the PCC, but there is no formal threshold
of value or complexity.”44
The only true difference between the PCC and the regular Patents
Court is that patent agents (who are not necessarily qualified lawyers)
can initiate and prosecute cases in the PCC.45 In addition, unlike in
the High Court, patent agents, solicitors, and barristers all have the

Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
766, 774 (2000) (contrasting the Patents Court and the Patents County
Court).
37 Michael Burdon, UK Patents County Court—Phoenix Risen?, PATENT
WORLD, July–Aug. 2003, at 19. The creation of a Patents County Court
was suggested by the so-called Committee of Interested Parties in
response to a 1986 white paper calling for all patent disputes to be
handled by the Patent Office rather than by the courts. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Michael Fysh, The Work of the Patents County Court, OXFORD
INTELL. PROP. RES. CENTRE E-JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2003, at 1,
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0303.pdf.
41 United Kingdom—Revival of the Patents County Court, LADAS &
PARRY MAY 2006 INFORMATION NEWSLETTER (Ladas & Parry LLP, New York,
N.Y.),
May
2006,
http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2006/20060500/UKPatentCountyCo
urt.shtml.
42 Id.
43 Burdon, supra note 37, at 19.
44 Id.
45 Fysh, supra note 40, at 2.
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right of “audience,” meaning the right to appear and advocate.46
Both the Patents Court and the PCC allow for parties to agree to,
or for a judge to impose, a so-called “streamlined procedure.”47 In the
default form of the streamlined procedure, all factual and expert
evidence is in writing, there is no requirement to give document
discovery, there are no experiments, cross-examination is only
permitted on isolated topics, and the total trial duration is fixed
(normally capped at one day) and takes place about six months after
the order setting the streamlined procedure.48 The judge may depart
from these default parameters, however.49 Legal advisors are under a
duty to draw their clients’ attention to the availability of a streamlined
procedure.50
The PCC seems to be garnering positive reviews from the English
legal community. One reviewer reports that under its first judge, the
“‘experiment’ seemed to have failed.”51 But now under Judge Fysh,
the court is “back in business”52 and “showing excellent recovery and
promise for the future.”53 In addition, the same reviewer suggests that
rigorous application of the streamlined procedure might help the PCC
differentiate itself from the Patents Court.54
The United States can import some lessons of the PCC, but
there are limits due to institutional and legal differences. The English
system lacks patent jury trials, whereas, in the United States, jury
trials are constitutionally required for patent cases, unless waived.55
In addition, the English have a long experience with a specialized
patent trial court; the United States has no experience. Nevertheless,
what successes there are seem auspicious for any small claims patent
effort in the United States. The very existence of a sophisticated court
system that, at least for bench trials, seems successful at cleaving
small patent cases from large ones and ushering the small cases
consistently toward resolution within six months shows that a Patent
Small Claims Court is possible. One other lesson emerges—it is
46

Burdon, supra note 37, at 19.
THE PATENTS COURT GUIDE § 10(d) (2003), http://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/infoabout/patents/crt_guide.htm (authorized by the
Chancellor of the High Court, United Kingdom).
48 Id. § 10(a).
49 Id. § 10(d).
50 Id. § 10(e).
51 Burdon, supra note 37, at 20.
52 Id. at 19.
53 Id. at 21.
54 Id. at 19.
55 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47
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important to staff such a court with a judge (or judges) dedicated to
its mission and enthusiastic for its success.

IV. A PROPOSED PATENT SMALL CLAIMS COURT
SOLUTION
Proposals for other specialized patent trial courts have gone
unheeded in the past. Perhaps they were too ambitious, seeking
nationwide changes all at once.56 This new proposal carefully avoids
that pitfall, as well as the pitfalls previously identified in the 1990
ABA Section Resolution 401.4. A Patent Small Claims Court can be
instituted locally in one district court on an experimental basis, using
an existing Article III judge.57 Then, if that experience justifies
nationwide expansion, Congress may step in to implement it.

A. IMPLEMENTATION VIA LOCAL RULES ON A TRIAL BASIS
Patent reform does not necessarily require an act of Congress.
There are already instances of patent reform that United States
District Courts have implemented via local rule. For example, the
Northern District of California implemented its own Patent Rules,
which govern the scheduling and exchange of contentions during
patent litigation.58 The Northern District of California Patent Rules
have been emulated by many district courts around the country. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld challenged aspects of
those Patent Rules as a valid exercise in local rulemaking in O2 Micro
International Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.59
In O2 Micro the Federal Circuit observed that to be valid, a local
rule must be consistent with both acts of Congress and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.60 The court explained that a local rule
inconsistent with the purposes of a federal rule is invalid.61 In O2
56 See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 36; John B. Pegram, Should the U.S.
Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with
that of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67 (1995). Mr. Pegram
advocated initially in 1995, and later in 2000, that the International Trade
Commission (ITC) become a specialized patent trial court for the entire
United States for all patent cases, large and small. Pegram, supra note 36,
at 782–83.
57 Having an Article III judge, versus a magistrate judge, keeps the
levels of potential appeal to a minimum.
58 N.D. Cal. Patent R. 1-1 to 4-7 (2008).
59 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355,
1363–66 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
60 Id. at 1365 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) and FED. R. CIV. P.
83(a)(1)).
61 Id.
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Micro a litigant challenged the aspect of the Northern District of
California Patent Rules that required a party to supplement its
contentions diligently upon learning new information revealing those
contentions to be incomplete.62 After analyzing the purpose and spirit
of the discovery regime codified by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court held, “we see nothing in the Federal Rules that is
inconsistent with local rules requiring the early disclosure of
infringement and invalidity contentions and requiring amendments to
contentions to be filed with diligence.”63 The court cautioned,
however, that “[i]f a local patent rule required the final identification
of infringement and invalidity contentions to occur at the outset of the
case, shortly after the pleadings were filed and well before the end of
discovery, it might well conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the
notice pleading and broad discovery regime created by the Federal
Rules.”64
Implementation via local rules carries a second distinct
advantage beyond postponing the need for legislative approval. It
allows a single district court to serve as an experimental or trial forum
for a Patent Small Claims Court. This obviates one of the pitfalls that
seems to have cursed prior proposals, namely, overambitious goals to
bring change to the entire federal court system in one swoop. 65

B. SUMMARY OF GOOD DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR A PATENT SMALL
CLAIMS COURT
Summarizing, any successful small claims court for patent
disputes should incorporate the following elements:
62

Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1366.
64 Id.
65 In an interview with the author, the Honorable Brian Barnett Duff
suggested that the idea might achieve greater success if rolled out in three
locations at once—e.g., a west coast court, an east coast court, and a
midwest court. Interview with Hon. Brian Barnett Duff, Senior U.S.
District Judge, retired (Jan. 13, 2009). A multi-court rollout has the
added advantage of allowing each court to impose slightly different rules,
even different thresholds of “small,” allowing subsequent evaluation of
which rules work best. Judge Duff, who once sat by designation at the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which has exclusive jurisdiction
over patent appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000)), also suggested that
each local rules committee might be well served to seek the participation
of a sitting Circuit Judge from the Federal Circuit. Interview with Hon.
Brian Barnett Duff, supra. The participation of a Federal Circuit judge
would lend such efforts added credibility, not to mention a useful appeals
court perspective.
63
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the court should be good at what it does (i.e., prone to
reach the right result) and have procedural rules to bring
cases to resolution quickly;
the court must meet the constitutional requirements of
the Seventh Amendment;
the court should be established at first via local court
rules in one district, and those rules must be consistent
with acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;
the court should be staffed by one or more judicial
officers who will not feel overburdened by the role, and
who will enthusiastically support its mission, and
the court should be mandatory once invoked by a
litigant, with no right of removal.

C. THE AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL OF A SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK
In light of the discussion above, I now set forth what I believe
are basic parameters for a successful U.S. Patent Small Claims Court.
These parameters should not be read as exhaustive, but rather as a
starting point for any United States district court to begin drafting
amendments to local rules.

1. Thresholds
A small claims court for patent disputes should be established,
setting the definition of “small” at less than one million dollars in
claimed damages. The threshold should serve as an initial claim, not
as a binding judicial admission. In other words, a plaintiff’s initial
pleading should be required to state on a sworn verification page that
it believes its claim for damages by the time of trial will be less than
one million dollars.66 If discovery reveals the claim is more valuable
than that, so be it; the plaintiff may seek more than one million
dollars. However, the rules should expressly provide that an opponent
may use the sworn verification to cross examine the plaintiff or its
experts who stray over the one million dollar line. As a result,
plaintiffs will dread crossing that line, lest their financial witness gets
impeached. These measures will separate the small cases from the
large, while preserving a plaintiff’s right to use new information
revealing that the infringement has caused more damage than
66 The discussion in this section assumes the patentee is the plaintiff,
but mirror-image rules can be drafted that contemplate the same basic
principals where an accused infringer is a plaintiff seeking a declaratory
judgment.
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previously thought.

2. Jury Trials
The court should allow a jury trial to either party who requests
it, as in the regular court system. This overcomes the defect in ABA
Resolution 401.4 which eliminated a jury trial in the first instance.
However, there is no reason to deny the inherent merit of speed and
efficiency when matters are tried to the court. Those merits include
the possibility of using procedures akin to the Patents Court and PCC
streamlined procedures. Thus, this proposal provides incentives for
litigants to waive a jury trial, as follows:
(a) If both parties waive a jury trial, the court will take all casein-chief evidence as written evidence, allowing live cross-examination
during trial. All issues may be presented (i.e., no issue will be
bifurcated).
(b) If, however, the plaintiff demands a jury, it gets one.
However, its case-in-chief will be limited to one full day of evidence,
and the issue of damages will be bifurcated (to be tried to the same
jury, but only after a liability verdict). While facially neutral,
bifurcation of damages will be viewed negatively by most plaintiffs.
(c) Finally, if the plaintiff waives a jury but the defendant
demands one, there will be a jury. Now, however, it is the defendant
who suffers time limits and bifurcation. If the defendant’s demand
necessitates a jury trial, the defendant will be limited to one full day
of rebuttal evidence, and all affirmative defenses (including invalidity
and unenforceability) will be bifurcated.67

3. Contentions and Discovery
Some mechanism should exist to ferret out contentions and
conclude document, written, and oral discovery quickly. For example,
every party who pleads a legal conclusion is automatically under an
obligation, within thirty days, to report all known facts and legal
theories supporting it (subject to supplementation). In effect, every
legal claim set forth in a pleading automatically volunteers the
67 While it would be “patently unconstitutional” to impose “a penalty
in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional
right,” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968), the right to a
jury trial is not “needlessly penalize[d]” under this scheme. It is allowable
to condition electing a jury trial on the right to introduce “slightly different
evidence” before a judge versus a jury, where the same remedies exist
under either type of trial. Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439, 445–46 (9th Cir.
1969), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 934 (1972).
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claimant to respond to a contention interrogatory seeking a full
explanation of the nature of that claim. In practice, a plaintiff who
pleads that a specific product infringes must automatically disclose,
within thirty days, the factual and legal basis for infringement.
Likewise, a defendant who pleads an affirmative defense must make
complementary automatic disclosures. An opponent receiving such
contentions must then base its document collection and production
on those contentions, regardless of whether individual requests have
been served. Supplementation in light of an opponent’s document
production will be allowed (preserving the validity of this framework
under O2 Micro). Customized follow-up discovery requests will be
allowed only after the first round of automatic disclosures and
production. This customized discovery may be limited to, for example,
ten document requests and three interrogatories. Finally, the default
number of depositions should be reduced to four without leave of
court.
Such automatic disclosures and exchanges should make it a
simple matter to schedule a trial date within six to eight months after
the filing of the complaint.

4. The Judicial Officer
As the PCC experience shows, much of the success of a Patent
Small Claims Court will depend on those who staff it. To guarantee
the first judge’s enthusiasm for the project and competency over
patent matters, the first district court to implement a Patent Small
Claims Court should poll its senior judge ranks. Senior U.S. district
judges have some discretion over their own caseloads. Better still, the
U.S. taxpayers are already paying for their services. If one, or even
two, senior district judges volunteer to substitute small claims patent
cases for cases they would otherwise adjudicate, the program might
begin with an experienced judiciary at the outset. There will be no
need for additional court staff or legislative appropriations. It is even
possible that the right judge who is already drawing a pension will
come out of full retirement, minimizing taxpayer costs for maximum
taxpayer return.
Many federal judges actually like patent cases.68 A senior judge
who enjoys presiding over patent cases might feel honored to become
68 See, e.g., Hon. James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent
Litigation Predicament in the United States (Mar. 26, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Univ. of Ill. Journal of Law, Tech. & Policy),
available at http://www.jltp.uiuc.edu/works/Holderman.htm.
Judge
Holderman writes, “As a United States District Court Judge, I enjoy patent
cases.” Id.
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the first judge to preside over the first specialized United States
patent trial court in history (albeit one which takes only small cases).
A federal judge who is enthusiastic for the project and focused on the
task at hand is more likely to issue thoughtful, cost-sensitive,
reversal-proof rulings.
V. CONCLUSION
A federal Patent Small Claims Court, if properly designed and
run, has every chance of being a positive development for all
stakeholders in the U.S. patent system. As a side benefit, it might also
reduce some of the burdens on a clogged regular court system. Prior
proposals never achieved sufficient momentum, despite the opinion
leaders who enthusiastically and unanimously backed the general
concept. This article has identified and proposed cures for some of the
problems that may have kept a small claims court for patent disputes
from being implemented.

